Five Hour Energy

Nadal outlasts Medvedev in an Australian Open epic

Nadal d Medvedev: 2-6, 6-7(5), 6-4, 6-4, 7-5

Well then…

First things first, I was completely wrong about something in my pre-match notes. I had assumed that Nadal needed to start well and that Medvedev would likely have a physical edge over a long 5 setter. Of course what actually happened was Nadal starting poorly, somehow clawing himself back into the match from the brink after losing the first two sets, and then proceeding to out-muscle Medvedev physically in the 4th and 5th sets. I got a bunch of the strategy right but it became most important in the 2nd half, rather than the 1st half, of the match.

The physical edge factor was a funny one because I had been saying for most of the tournament that Medvedev’s complete lack of off-season looked like it had jaded him a bit, and may compromise his run to the final (especially after the exhausting 5 setter vs Auger-Aliassime). But after his routine match against Tsitsipas, Medvedev looked great and most of my doubts over his fitness went away (apparently incorrectly). Along the same lines, Nadal has lost a bunch of close, physical matches and sets in his late-career that have somewhat dented his reputation as one of the toughest outs in tennis. But Medvedev did happen to tire as the match wore on, and Nadal did happen to play a lot of his best tennis as the match got deeper and deeper in. This was the first time Nadal has come back to win, from two sets to love down in a best of 5 match, since Wimbledon 2007 (vs Youzhny). I and many others doubted Nadal, and as Rafa has done so often in his career, he proved many of us wrong. This is always one of the hazards of trying to run any kind of analysis on truly great players: they don’t conform to normal human standards, so normal human analysis simply doesn’t apply.

Both Medvedev and his coach Gilles Cervara shared similar sentiments:

Medvedev: “The way he managed to play even in the tough moments, and again for him it’s trying to make history, even if he’s tries not to think about this, it must have been in his head. Huge respect. Huge respect for beating me, because I really tried my best. Trophy ceremony: “Tough to talk after playing for five hours and 30 minutes and losing, but I want to congratulate Rafa because what he did today, I was amazed. After the match I asked him, ‘Are you tired?’ because it was insane. You raised your level after the first two sets for your 21st Grand Slam title. You are an amazing champion, it was unbelievable.”

Cervara: “Nadal was incredible. He always finds a resource, the power that makes him able to never give up, to raise his level of play, to release physical power that is mind-blowing. It was stratospheric."

Doing match analysis of 5 set epics like this is always rather difficult, mostly because so much happens during the course of a five and a half hour match. The overall stats tell a very muddy story of what unfolded, and even some of the set-specific numbers can have a bad signal to noise ratio. I’m going to try to focus mostly on the turnaround and comeback from Nadal, and the decline from Medvedev.

There was a lot of really fascinating stuff in this match.

First off, the obvious zoomed out stuff:

↑ You can see the gradual shift of (green = better) performance over to Nadal as the match goes on, or at worst for Nadal equalising some of the categories that he was lagging behind in so badly for most of the two first sets. Nadal essentially wrestled the serve/return dynamic narrowly into his favour over the course of the 5 and a half hours. Medvedev went from having a huge serving advantage to having the same as, or worse than, Nadal. Both guys were phenomenal on return in set 4, but Nadal just pulled away with a return of serve edge in what turned out to be a very close 5th set. Nadal’s first two sets featured a host of unusual unforced errors, likely because of how few free points he was able to create.

↑ The point length data tells a decent, if un-detailed, story. Medvedev completely dominant over Nadal in set 1, in most point categories, but especially the short points with Nadal unable to find cheap points on his serve. In set 2 Nadal’s serve starts to improve which helps him close the short point gap but he still lagged behind Medvedev in the longer rallies. But in sets 3,4 & 5, Nadal and Medvedev have near identical short point performance, and Nadal starts to take control of more of the longer points and rallies. I’ll get to how he did that in a bit.

Nadal’s serve+1 data is linked here (it wasn’t that instructive but up to you if you’d like to take a look).

The transition in sets 1-3

Nadal started the match serving poorly (half way through the set he had landed only 38% of his 1st serves and the start of the 2nd set wasn’t much better) and Medvedev was compounding this problem by returning excellently and deeply. This meant that Nadal was largely unable to set up most of the short point patterns he wanted and Medvedev’s brilliant backhand feasted on his slow starting opponent.

Medvedev (in white/light-green) breaking Nadal (in purple) in set 1 with a deep 2nd serve backhand return.

The 2nd set however, despite Nadal losing it, offered quite a lot of hope for Rafa in the form of a slowly improving serve and some better rally patterns (especially off the backhand and a couple of drop shots).

Nadal should have won what was quite a messy 2nd set after serving for it at 5*-3, holding a set point, and then again leading by 5*-3 in the tiebreak (he moved in too late on a serve and volley attempt and then played too safe on two subsequent volleys to lose three points he would like to be winning). Nadal didn’t take his chances and the match looked all but over for many watching with Medvedev now holding a two sets to love lead.

But the slowly improving Nadal finally made his mark in set 3. The most stark difference was his serve finally showing up:

↑ Nadal, likely hurt by his slow serving start and lack of rhythm, opted for very safe 1st serve placement early in the match. On the left you can see set 1’s first serve placement, with most 1st serves central and many relatively short in the service box. But Nadal eventually sorted out his serve in set 3, on the right, not only landing many more 1st serves but also hitting much closer to the spots which would give Medvedev less routine returns.

↑ There was a lot of this in sets one and two. Nadal hitting a very safe 1st serve into Medvedev’s strongest backhand return and having to play his +1 or 2nd shot on the back foot, sometimes even in his backhand corner.

↑ I can only assume Nadal was so miffed by starting off so badly with his serve that he decided to opt to at least get it in, playing it safe, rather than try and hit his spots for most of the first two sets. The downside to that strategy was that Medvedev had little trouble redirecting returns deep onto Nadal’s baseline, negating much of Nadal’s serving advantage. Nadal’s serve seemed to be a magnet to Medvedev’s best returns on the backhand side with no serves going out wide to the Medvedev forehand on the deuce side in set 1.

This produced a stark disparity in serve effectiveness between the two players in the first two sets, before Nadal was able to equalize (or occasionally surpass Medvedev) in sets 3, 4 & 5:

Nadal’s return steadily got better as the match wore on, and Medvedev’s got slightly worse (or more accurately it got less help by Nadal’s serve). Medvedev’s serve performance didn’t suffer too much (in terms of speed) as the match ran long to a 5th set, so a lot of the needle moving Nadal’s way was simply Nadal upping his return game.

Nadal actually hit his highest unreturned serve rate of the match in the final set (40% of his 1st serves didn’t come back in set 5, compared to just 10-20% in the first four sets), which won’t show up in the ‘deep returns’ but is one of the reasons Nadal’s serve was effective late in the match. This was down to a combination of good Nadal spot serving and increasingly tired Medvedev backhands.

The micro, return and rally strategy

The start of the third set was very tense. Nadal squandered a break point in Medvedev’s first service game and then faced multiple break points, in a deep 0-40 hole, at 2*-3 on his serve.

You could be forgiven for thinking that the match was over at this point.

The funny thing about this, now famous, 2*-3 game in the 3rd set is that Nadal didn’t play badly to find himself in that 0-40 hole. First he missed a forehand after creating the right opportunity…

Great return from Medvedev but this is what Nadal is trying to achieve with the backhand slice down the line, coaxing Medvedev into hitting the safer option cross court into Nadal’s strength (forehand). Unfortunately for Nadal, his forehand down the line wouldn’t start firing until much later in the match (and it’s almost always less consistent against Medvedev’s flat ball), but it was still the right intention regardless of the miss. The other slice option for Nadal is the slice cross court into the weaker Medvedev forehand. That also worked well today but usually just leaves Nadal with another backhand rather than a forehand.

Nadal’s 1st serve was finally landing to start the 3rd set and starting to hit some of his spots…

The 3rd set felt like the first time in the match where Nadal was consistently playing comfortable forehands after landing his 1st serve.

…and his forehand speed had jumped up 12mph (20kph) in the first few games of the 3rd set compared to the first 2 sets. Nadal had made many of the adjustments necessary but they just weren’t paying off yet in face of a high level opponent. After Nadal had missed that forehand at 2*-3 15-0, Medvedev came up with an amazing return and an incredible lob + backhand pass on the way to creating BP chances:

Just too good from Mevdedev to create three break points in set 3. Nadal hits a near perfect serve, arguably could have done better on the smash, but everything else is just unreal from Medvedev, from the lob to the backhand winner.

That Nadal didn’t succumb in those moments, down multiple break points, is part of what makes these players so great. Rafa’s escape from 0-40 in that game gave him the opportunity to capitalise on the parts of his game that were now going well more generally, even if the in-the-moment points weren’t going his way. That takes extraordinary experience and self-belief at the top of the game to pull off. Nadal saved the three BP’s with:

• Drop shot winner

• Medvedev backhand unforced error after brilliant, deep return

• Bad Medvedev drop shot

Those two Medvedev mistakes were a couple of his few, major errors in the match (there weren’t many at all although one more came at deuce a few points later). It felt like Medvedev was pressing a bit too hard in those moments especially on the backhand unforced error, perhaps a combination of starting to feel a bit tired while also glimpsing the finish line:

This was probably Medvedev’s worst mistake of match. He had played the point perfectly, hit a great return deep into the Nadal backhand, set up the right shot to attack, and then somehow overplayed (something he really hadn’t done at all up to this point off the backhand)

And after saving the break points, at deuce in the same game, something rather ominous happened for Medvedev:

Nadal’s slice had been a mixed bag down the line into the Medvedev backhand. Earlier in the match he had been getting locked back in his backhand corner by Medvedev’s laser accurate backhand down the line. But starting in set two and becoming more obvious in sets 3 and 4, Nadal started to be far more offensive with his backhand when presented with the right opportunities. He doesn’t quite get the width with his forehand down the line here, but still goes on the offensive with a flatter backhand down the line and then the angled one cross court. In set one and parts of two, Nadal probably would have looked to slice again on one or both of those last two backhands. Nadal’s backhand suddenly looking more offensive was bad news for Medvedev.

Not only that but Nadal’s forehand down the line was now starting to land more regularly as well as Nadal took the 3rd set:

Both Nadal and Medvedev had some troubles on serve to start the 4th set with three breaks back to back, but both were also returning extremely well at this point. Most importantly for Nadal, his backhand improvements are paying dividends:

↑ Starting in sets 3 and 4 onwards Nadal often had an answer to Medvedev’s excellent backhand down the line. In sets 1 and 2 Nadal would often have sliced this shot (Nadal actually started the match doing this in the first four games but missed a few and seemed to retreat a bit), but Nadal seemed to learn quickly enough that hitting offensively cross court into the Medvedev forehand from those defensive backhand positions would offer up more options. Nadal executed brilliantly for the rest of the match with this shot and forced Medvedev to chase balls to his weaker forehand wing.

↑ At this point Nadal’s coming up with all sorts of impressive stuff to save break points. Not a bad return from Medvedev but that Nadal forehand +1 is huge.

The rest of the 4th set was far from routine but Nadal seemed to have an upper hand physically at this point with Medvedev playing some desperate and unsuccessful serve and volley and drop shot points to try and avoid longer baseline exchanges (Medvedev finishes 2/6 on serve and volley in set 4). Medvedev was also chugging pickle juice to avoid cramps throughout the 3rd and 4th sets.

But one of the reasons for Nadal’s ascendancy at this stage of the match is that he seemed to figure out one of Medvedev’s favourite serves:

Medvedev’s win rate when hitting his favourite serve in this matchup, the slice out wide serve to Nadal’s backhand on the Deuce side. Nadal either got a read on that serve or just happened to return particularly well from outside the tramlines with his backhand for the latter two sets.

↑ Nadal setting up break point in set 4 with a deep 1st serve return right onto Medvedev’s shoelaces.

As the match headed to a 5th set, Medvedev’s tired legs and cooler, nighttime conditions really highlighted the disparity in forehand power between the two players:

↑ Medvedev hits a great backhand onto Nadal’s baseline here but when faced with the short forehand ball he can’t do anything with it, before Nadal starts working him over with his own forehand. It was moments like this where Nadal’s comparatively big forehand weapon made an obvious difference.

In the last three sets, as the court got harder to hit through and the players got more fatigued, this happened:

Combined winners and forcing shots (shots that force errors from the opponent)

• Nadal: 33 forehand, 23 backhand (55 total)

• Medvedev: 19 forehand, 21 backhand (40 total)

15 more points in terms of offence is not insignificant over three sets. Nor was Nadal’s ability to hit unretrunable 1st serves in important moments during the 5th set.

↑ Nadal returning well off that wide Medvedev serve again and setting up the forehand he wanted with the low pace slice.Nadal’s shorter angles really working Medvedev’s tired leg bend and footwork at this point. Nadal’s short angles have always been a weapon against Medvedev forcing him side to side *and forward* to try and cut off the angle which makes it harder for Med to laterally smother the deep court, and recover back to centre, as he always does so well.

One of the other reasons Nadal’s offensive, angled backhand was so important is because Nadal knows he’s a huge favourite for the point if Medvedev goes down the line with his forehand and doesn’t hit a clean winner (like above). Nadal can easily use his angled forehand to exploit the open space, which leaves Medvedev pretty bad options,

After breaking serve with a wonderful forehand down the line, Nadal, while serving for the title at 5*-4, choked a bit under the tension and nerves, and Medvedev managed to get back on serve for 5-5.

According to Nadal he was thinking this at the time:

“Well after that I said 'fuck', one more time break up in the 5th and I gonna lose again like in 2012 and 2017.”

What Nadal did next to set up break points, to avoid his third Australian Open final 5th set heartbreak, was impressive however. Medvedev, now targeting the T on the Deuce side after Nadal’s good backhand returns out wide earlier, hits two 128mph 1st serves but Nadal still puts both of them back in play, one of them deep. Nadal wins both points which sets up more chances to break again. Finally, Nadal converts one with another good, deep return off a brilliant Medvedev serve. Medvedev’s difficulty in generating his own pace from his forehand hurting him again:

Nadal gets the decisive (re)break with a great return.

There’s one final boss for Nadal and it’s waiting on the first point of the next game as he tries (again) to serve out the title:

Medvedev, in one last hurrah, unloads on some backhands to try and put Nadal in trouble. Fittingly though it’s Nadal’s excellent backhand cross court, off a deep Medvedev backhand, that forces the error and wins the point.

Nadal then goes: unreturnable serve, ace, big 1-2 punch and a volley put-away for the win.

Easily one of best and biggest wins of Nadal’s career. If not for moving him one clear of his rivals being the first to reach 21 Slams, then for winning the Australian Open for the second time. A tournament which seems to have been cursed for him since he first won it in 2009.

The thing that sticks with me having watched this match as it happened, and then again scrubbing back and forth through the entire thing, was how well Medvedev played for most of the match. Outside the backhand unforced errors, up break points at 3-2* in the 3rd, and couple of dodgy shot selections in set 4, I can’t find much that Medvedev did that was obviously wrong considering the stakes and pressure. The erratic drop shots and the hit or miss serve and volleys are easy targets for criticism, but the Russian was desperately trying to find ways to avoid rallies with Nadal for much of the 4th and 5th sets. And against someone as ruthless as Nadal, a few mistakes in influential moments are all it takes. Medvedev clearly got tired, but some lethargic footwork into backhands from the latter two sets aside, he competed to a very high level and served excellently for the most part, even deep into the 5th set. The only shot I’d be thinking about at night if I were him is that backhand miss at 15-40 at 3-2* in the 3rd set.

Apologies if this analysis was less cogent and concise than usual. I usually pick specific parts of 5 setters to do analysis of due to the length, but this match had so much going on, at very different parts of the match, that it seemed silly to isolate one or two sets and ignore the rest.

I’ll leave you with this. I don’t think Medvedev choked. I think he and Nadal played the same sort of unbelievably competitive, occasionally edgy, fine-margin, gruelling, baseline-chess-match they almost always do, at least after Nadal recovered from a slow start (the avg rally in Nadal’s previous rounds was 3.5, but against Medvedev it fluctuated between 6-7). Neither volleyed well thanks to a combination of how high the stakes were to get volleys right against another elite baseliner, and some bad backhand volleying form from Medvedev.

The match was extremely even overall and Nadal did what many, including me, thought he couldn’t do at his age, and at this stage of an injury comeback — tough out the best, by form, hard-courter in the world in the prime of his career.

An extraordinary win for Nadal. And merely a postponement of what feels like Medvedev’s inevitable titles here in Melbourne.

— MW

Nadal and Medvedev share battle stories after the match.

Twitter: @mattracquet

See you on Thursday.

Top: Mark Metcalfe/Getty, Bottom: Andy Cheung/Getty

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